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Nielsen’s Nook
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5. Pseudo-Dionysius (1 of 2)

Will Nielsen
May 9th, 2006
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“Byzantine thought never escaped from the great problem of the relationship between Greek philosophy and Christian revelation.” It was the condemnation of Origen by Justinian that brought a great blow to neo-Platonism, which had gained respect in Christian circles after it had been adopted by the Gnostics. It is a view that presented the cosmos as a hierarchy in which the higher beings were intermediaries for the lower, while all emanated from God. Insofar as all idea of creation ex nihilo was excluded, this method made it impossible to avoid a monistic and essentially pantheistic worldview.

Nevertheless Origen did bring the doctrine of free-will as a corrective to neo-Platonism. However, out of the ashes of Origen’s condemnation the “Alexandrian vision” rose, a phoenix flying on the authority of a source claiming to be from Dionysius the Areopagite, a disciple of St. Paul in Athens. While we are certain that the historical Dionysius did not write Corpus Areopagiticum, many today believe Pseudo-Dionysius (PD) belonged to Severian circles of Syria, which represented the moderate Monophysites. These circles sought to integrate within a Christian system the hierarchical world of neo-Platonism. PD’s contribution was in introducing the corrective of God’s absolute transcendence, influencing Byzantine thinking along the lines of theology and hierarchies.

Enomius and the Cappadocian Fathers
Arian extremists of the fourth century C.E., such as Eunomius, had argued that humanity could know God in his essence; i.e., as God knows himself. The Fathers made recourse through apophatic theology (negative theology). In other words, we may know what God is not, but it is impossible to say what God is. While Eunomius maintained that God in his essence (i.e., the Father) is knowable, the Cappadocian Fathers responded with the absolute transcendence of the divine essence (i.e., God is not knowable in his essence).

It is important to understand that the negations of apophatic theology are not on account of humanity’s fallen position and resultant incapacity to know God; rather, it reflects the unknowability of God of God in his essence. Gregory of Nyssa explains to us that God “who by nature is invisible becomes visible through his energies, appearing in what is around him.” (p 94). The Fathers in their controversy with Eunomius defended the biblical conception of the living and acting God over against a “philosophical and intellectualistic conception of Deity-Essence.”

In the Platonic and Origenist traditions, the mind, in order to know God, must free itself from the prison-house of the material world and become its own self again. This was insufficient for Pseudo-Dionysius, who taught that the mind must come out of itself because the knowledge of God is beyond the mind (ὑπέρ νοῦν).

Thus, PD detaches himself from two important neo-Platonic postulates:

  • The natural divinity of the νοῦς (mind)
  • The knowability of the divine essence

This does not exclude … the meeting between God and created beings; on the contrary, this meeting constitutes the aim and ultimate meaning of beings. It supposes a descending movement on the part of God, out of himself, to make himself approachable and knowable, and an ascending movement on the part of beings who first of all recover their ‘analogy’ with God, that is, their capacity to participate in the virtues of God; then, coming out of themselves, to participate in the very being of God (but not in his essence), and ‘go back’ (ἐπιστροφή) to God.(p 95)

It is precisely because PD does not identify the divine essence with the Platonic “One” that it is possible for him to speak of distinctions in God.

8 Responses to “5. Pseudo-Dionysius (1 of 2)”

Nice post! I greatly appreciate the focus on God’s transcendence that comes through with PD and the Greek fathers. I look forward to part II!

Cheers,
Cynthia

Left by Cynthia Nielsen on May 10th, 2006

I don’t think its fair to say that the Reformed tradition has maintained the same idea concerning the absolute transcendence of the divine essence since they have not adocated the idea that God is hyper ousia and they have maintained the doctrine of divine simplicity, either in its Thomistic or Scotistic falvors. part of the problem is whether by essence you mean ousia or esse, because historically, between East and West the two terms are not univocally employed.

Left by Acolyte4236 on May 15th, 2006

Acolyte,

Thank you very much for you interaction. Let me respond in a threefold manner.

First, I am not speaking of the Reformed Tradition generally; rather, I am saying that conceptually Calvin, Bavinck, Berkouwer, Hodge and Van Til have maintained such notions. Part of the problem between East and West has been a difficulty to get past the words and into the concepts. If I understand the history of the Fifth Ecumenical Council this was a significant hurdle that was addressed regarding Cyril of Alexandria. He had not used the words of Chalcedonians and had been denounced a Monophysite. When his work began to be read conceptually it was seen that he was not Monophysite after all but was simply seeking to uphold the integrity of Christ against the Nestorians.

Second, the Fifth Ecumenical Council and Justinians writings in so far as I have read of them does not speak of a notion of hyper ousia. Meyendorff has not mentioned it in his book. Therefore, my comment about the specific Reformed writers would apply to conciliar conceptions that do not seem to include hyper ousia.

Finally, there is much of the fifth council and the works of John Meyendorff and other Eastern writers that I have not read and perhaps you might have insight into where I am misreading or misunderstanding. I am open to your input. Thank you again for your interaction.

Left by W.Nielsen on May 15th, 2006

Regarding the Reformed writers mentioned (Calvin, Bavinck, Berkouwer, Hodge and Van Til) it should be noted that 4 of the 5 of them were very much in a continental tradition which insulated those who came after Thomas Reid from his Common Sense Realism and the analytic philosophyical tradition that flowed from Britain. Hodge, the exception, was influenced by said traditions; however, he was also very well versed and interacted much with continental writers such as Bavinck, who has only in the last few years had his major work Gereformanda Dogmatiek translated into English.

Left by W.Nielsen on May 15th, 2006

The notion of hyper ousia is found in Athanasius, the Cappadocians and Cyril, not to mention Maximus. God is only said to be being at the level of the divine names or energies. It is at odds with the Augustinian notion of God as being. For Augustine the Good is being, whereas for the Easterners, the Good is beyond being.

Left by Acolyte4236 on May 19th, 2006

A-4236,

I believe you are right about the hyper ousia distinction. In reading I have done since our last interchange in Meyendorff’s Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, I have come across not only the distinction of hyper ousia but the tension that it has with Augustine’s notion of God as being.

So if you will allow me to back-pedal a little bit, I would say that if we mean by God as being the same thing we mean when we say that a human is a being then I think we encounter quite a difficulty. In my limited exposure to Thomas, I have found that he is conscious of this problem and certainly goes about attempting to resolve it in a way different than that of Scotus, who seems to speak of being univocally and hence problematically.

I will say that Calvin, Bavinck and Van Til in their unique ways are trying to maintain and underscore the transcendence of God’s essence while making analogy when speaking of his image, humanity.

Thanks for the corrective here.

Left by W.Nielsen on May 21st, 2006

Backpedalling is certainly acceptable. As Lewis noted, sometimes we have to go backward before we can go forward. :)

The Cappadocian notion is at odds with Augustine’s notion because Augustine collapses the One and the Nous so that God is be-ing. He denies as do later Scholastics, that God is the common being of creatures, and in this sense God is hyper ousia. But this leaves untouched the idea that God is be-ing. Self subsisting be-ing is still be-ing nonetheless. For Thomas, what differentiates us from God is our composition and God’s lack of it. What distinguishes us from God for Scotus is the intensity of our be-ing. For both though, God is still most properly called be-ing or esse.

For the Cappadocians as well as for Maximus, God is being or esse/activity, only at the level of the divine names. That is, no divine name refers to God ad intra. God is both being and not being. Therefore, the distinction between God as esse or activity and God as hyper-ousia is not epistemological as it is for Thomas, or formal as it is for Scotus. Contra Thomas, the activities exist as metaphysically distinct apart from our judgments. Contra Scotus, they are different acts, some of which have a begining while others do not, while all of them are uncreated. Consequently, the plurality in God is not only real but wider than the plurality of the divine persons. God’s nature therefore is wider than his essence.

How’s that?

For some bibliography on the pre-scholastic use see Carabine’s, The Unknown God: Negative Theology in the Platonic Tradition: Plato to Eriugena.

Left by Acolyte4236 on May 22nd, 2006

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Left by Nielsen’s Nook » Christ in Eastern Christian Thought by Fr. John Meyendorff on March 25th, 2007

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