Nielsen’s Nook

Leontius of Jerusalem (LJ) moved to deal with the theopaschism by arguing that the Word suffered hypostatically, in his own flesh, because the hypostasis was ontologically distinct from the divine nature Christ possesses and the human nature that he assumed. “In this hypostasis resides the union of the natures or essences which otherwise cannot be confused.” (p 78) Later Byzantine theology would draw this idea from LJ (who was pulling from Cyril) into its fundamental element:

[On the one hand,] the natures, even after the union, are two, because the uncreated divine essence can never as such be partaken of in any form by the created nature…. But, on the other hand, the humanity assumed by the Logos, hypostatized in him, deified by his energies, becomes itself the source of divine life, because it is deified not simply by grace but because it is the Word’s own flesh. Here is the difference between Christ and the Christians, between hypostatic possession of divine life and deification by grace and participation. (p 78)

It is this humanity of the Word, hypostatized in him, that is the foundation of the doctrine of the deification of man as the true content of salvation. It was St. Maximus the Confessor who showed that participation in the divine did not imply the passivity of the human nature; rather, it implied the restoration fo its authentic activity.

The Latin Monk, John Maxentius, intervened both at Rome and Constantinople to have the theopaschite formula approved and is mentioned as witness to the unity that could then still unite East and West in christological questions. Justinian sought to impose this unity on the whole of the empire, in which he specifically sought to concilliate the Monophysites by making them accept Chalcedon.

In 544, Justinian pronounced an edict against Theodore of Mopsuestia, the writings in which Theodoret of Cyrus attacked the anathematisms of Cyril of Alexandria, and the letter of Ibas to Mari the Persian (i.e., the so called Three Chapters, κεφάλαια). Justinian exercised caution in the way he nuanced his edict with respect to Theodoret and Ibas which prevented the entire Antiochene school from being condemned and thus depriving the church of the balance to the post humous triumph of Cyril. (p 81)

Justinian’s Confession of Faith (ὁμολογία πίστεως) is addressed to the whole fullness of the Catholic Church strongly asserts the orthodoxy of the theopaschite formulas, which had become the litmus test of orthodoxy for him. In this work Justinian follows LJ in recognizing a distinction between nature and hypostasis; nature can only exist within hypostasis. Justinian makes a significant terminological concession to the great Monophysite Severus, when he admits that the natures of Christ “can only be distinguished by speech and thought, and not as two distinct things.” (p 82) Thus, under the existing tensions, the only means of unity was to cause both sides to recognize that the difference between Cyril and Chalcedon was merely verbal and not conceptual.

In his desire to condemn Nestorianism (an important component in winning back the Monophysites), Justinian reiterated the “unity of subject in the incarnate Word.” (p 83) The only restriction to Cyril’s triumph was that was that the expression μία φύσις (one nature) was forbidden to be understood in any way other than as a synonym of μία ὑπόστασις (one hypostasis). Cyril is, therefore, orthodox; however, he must be considered in light of Chalcedon.

The fifth council then by rehabilitating the Cyrillian concept of the unity of subject in Christ, directed its energy to the hypostatic unity of the incarnate Word. Christ’s humanity then is considered fully consubstantial with us. His hypostasis then was the pre-existing and divine Logos. All this is possible when hypostasis retains its “open” character as foundational and not contentful and is not identified with a “simple aspect of the natural existence, human or divine.” (p 85)

Byzantine Christology by Justinian’s time has been criticized for leaving too much of Christ’s psychological life in the dark. Thus, the decisions of the fifith council must be seen as one step along the way in the development of a more robust christology. Significant later developments would be seen especially in St. Maximus’s doctrine of the two wills and his conception of deification. The critics of the fifth council’s christology seem to assert their criticism on the basis of Thomas’ notion of “pure nature” which does not comport with either “the patristic conception of sin or with that of deification.” (p 86)

Human nature, at the contact of God, does not disappear; on the contrary it becomes fully human, for God cannot destroy what he has made. (p 86)

De Sectis, attributed to Leontius of Byzantium between 581 and 607 CE, articulates a consciousness of Christ’s consubstantiality with humanity. Thus, when the scriptures teach that Christ was progessing in age and wisdom (Lk 2:52); this was taken as meaning that he was learning what he did not know, i.e., that he suffered ignorance. Most Byzantine writers have shunned the idea of ignorance in Christ on account of the Greek notion of ignorance that is predicated on sin. Further, a certain philosophy of gnosis made knowledge the demonstration of unfallen nature. “Christ could not be ignorant because he was the new Adam.” For St. Cyril this ignorance was something Christ assumed willingly in the “framework of economy”; however, it was nevertheless a genuine ignorance. Hence, the author of De Sectis was able to draw from the great Alexandrian doctor. (p 87)

Such thinking raised anthropological questions. Was humanity by nature corruptible? If so does this mean that when Christ assumes human nature that he is consequently assuming corruptibility? It was Severus of Antioch, in agreement with Chalcedon and arguing against Julian, who asserted that Adam was incorruptible prior to the Fall only insofar as he participated in the divine incorruptibility. It is in the resurrection then that Christ gives incorruptibility back to human nature (via participation).

It is worth noting that in condemning Julian of Halicarnassus “the Christian East ignored … as a whole the doctrine of original sin ‘of nature’” (p 88), wanting to shield Christ from such a nature. Humanity’s mortality is thought not to be “a state of sin, but a condition of human nature that the Word, by his incarnation, came to assume and, by his resurrection, re-established into the grace of immortality.” (p 88-9)

In conclusion, this shows that fifth century christology, viz. its theopaschite formulae, did not interfere with the reality of Christ’s human nature, wich is also consubstantial with our human nature, being limited, ignorant and corruptible. By confessing “God suffered in the flesh,” one underscores the corruptible state of human nature that Christ came to save by assuming it in the precise condition which Adam’s sin had rendered it.